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LEXISNEXIS SUMMARY:
... To determine whether these effects of revolving-door laws on electricity prices are robust to other state-level control
variables, we estimate the following regression equation: ...where log( p st ) is the natural logarithm of real electricity
prices (residential, industrial, or commercial) in state s during year t; elected st is an indicator variable that equals one if
state s elects its public utility commissioners in year t and zero otherwise; revolving st is an indicator variable that
equals one if state s has adopted a revolving-door law by year t and zero otherwise; X st is a vector of state-year control
variables that includes a measure of electricity production costs (Besley and Coate's 2003 fuel cost index), state
population, state population squared, the state-level legislative ideology index, the Democratic governor indicator, real
income per capita, real income per capita squared, the percentage of the population over age 65, and the percentage of
the population between ages 5 and 17; S s and T t are state and year fixed effects; gamma s t is the state-specific time
trend; and epsilon st is an error term. ... Revolving-Door Regulations and Electricity Prices We first analyze how
post-government-employment restrictions affect outcomes by examining the impact of these laws on electricity prices.
... Figures 1, 2, and 3 show the relationship between the age-averaged adjusted price in states with laws and the age of
revolving-door laws (for the 5 years before and after the adoption of revolving-door regulations) for industrial,
residential, and commercial prices, respectively.
HIGHLIGHT: Abstract
On the basis of evidence from state public utility commissions, we find that revolving-door laws--laws
that restrict the post-government-employment opportunities of public sector workers, including public
utility regulators--do not do much, at least with respect to electricity prices. In this paper, we take
advantage of a quasi experiment afforded by the fact that revolving-door laws were introduced in
different states at different times to investigate their effects on electricity prices. Our findings suggest
that while revolving-door laws temporarily dampen industrial electricity prices, they have no effect on
commercial or residential prices. There is also some evidence that these regulations affect the
characteristics of state public utility commissioners; commissioners from states with revolving-door
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regulations serve shorter terms and are less likely to be subsequently employed in the private sector,
compared with their counterparts from states without revolving-door laws.
TEXT:
[*421] 1. Introduction
It is often argued that revolving-door regulations--laws that restrict the post-government-employment options of public
employees--advance the public interest. Plans to pursue a subsequent career in the private sector may induce current
public employees (for instance, regulators) to treat potential private sector employers favorably. Contacts and inside
information obtained by employees while in public employment may also give firms that hire them undue influence on
government decision making. Revolving-door laws can play a role in reducing the potential for capture of the regulatory
apparatus by regulated [*422] firms. For instance, in the context of public utility regulation, revolving-door laws--by
precluding or delaying the possibility of future employment of current regulators by public utilities--may reduce the
likelihood that utility commissioners will set rates that are favorable to utilities. Accordingly, a majority of state
governments, as well as the U.S. federal government, restrict the labor market opportunities of their former employees.
n1
While policy makers and politicians have emphasized the benefits of revolving-door laws, economists and political
scientists have argued that post-government-employment restrictions may not have the desired effects. Take rate
regulation of public utilities as an example. Revolving-door laws may have dampening effects on the prices that utilities
are allowed to charge. But if cost changes have to be accommodated in the long run, then any dampening effects will be
short-lived. Furthermore, it is not clear that employment restrictions curtail the influence of all special interests.
Regulations aimed at reducing the influence of regulated firms may facilitate capture of the regulatory apparatus by
other interest groups, for instance, organized consumers. Finally, these laws have potentially costly unintended
consequences. Restrictions on future employment options may discourage ambitious, career-oriented individuals from
entering or remaining in public service, preclude welfare-enhancing interactions between the private and public sectors,
or lower a regulator's incentive to invest in industry-specific knowledge (Che 1995; Salant 1995). n2
Yet relatively little scholarship has empirically evaluated the effects of revolving-door regulations. This is an
important omission since there is evidence that the revolving door influences the behavior of regulators (Berry 1979;
Gormley 1979; Navarro 1982; Freitag 1983; Cohen 1986). Moreover, substantial resources are devoted to enforcing
revolving-door regulations at the federal, state, and local levels. n3 Our paper attempts to fill this void in the literature.
We first exploit quasi-experimental variation across states and time in the introduction of revolving-door regulations to
examine how these laws influence electricity prices charged to residential, commercial, and industrial customers. We
then use individual-level data for a sample of state public utility commissioners to explore how revolving-door laws
affect two characteristics of these individuals: their length of tenure as commissioners and their subsequent career paths
after leaving public service.
[*423] Our key findings are as follows. The introduction of state-level revolving-door laws temporarily lowers
electricity prices, but this dampening effect applies only to the prices faced by industrial consumers, not residential or
commercial prices. This finding suggests two limitations of revolving-door regulations. First, by reducing the likelihood
of industry capture of the regulatory apparatus, these regulations may influence policy choices and outcomes in ways
that diminish the influence of public utilities in the short term but facilitate the influence of other interest groups,
specifically those representing organized electricity consumer interests. Second, revolving-door regulations do not have
a lasting effect on prices, and most likely because of the necessity of accommodating cost increases eventually in a
setting where price/cost margins are small.
We also find that commissioners from states with revolving-door laws serve shorter terms and are less likely to be
employed in the private sector after leaving government service. Thus, the laws seem effective in reducing employment
opportunities of former regulators. But to the extent that they increase the turnover rate of regulators, and that
experience is valuable for government jobs, the laws may have harmful effects on commissioner quality.
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This research builds on a handful of other studies. First, Besley and Coate (2003) find that electricity prices are
significantly lower in states that elect public utility commissioners than in states where commissioners are appointed.
Using the same data set, we also find that electricity prices are lower in states that elect their public utility
commissioners, even when we control for the presence of a revolving-door law. Accordingly, our analysis furthers
Besley and Coate (2003) by providing evidence of another institution that may affect consumer-regulator agency costs.
This paper is also related to Gely and Zardkoohi (2001), who analyze the effect of federal
post-government-employment restrictions introduced during the Clinton administration on the stock returns of firms
associated with cabinet members. These authors show that firms associated with cabinet members appointed during the
Carter, Reagan, and Bush Sr. administrations experienced above-normal returns, but those associated with cabinet
members appointed during the Clinton administration obtained lower returns. Gely and Zardkoohi thus show that the
value of connections established while working for the government are significantly curtailed as a result of
revolving-door regulations.
Finally, Che (1995) and Salant (1995) develop theoretical models to show how regulations that reduce the
opportunities for interaction between public and private sectors harm welfare. While we cannot test these hypotheses
directly, our evidence on the relationship between revolving-door regulations and commissioner characteristics is
suggestive of another unintended consequence of revolving-door regulations, namely, the selection of less ambitious
individuals into public service.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical analysis of how the
introduction of revolving-door laws affected state-level electricity prices. Section 3 discusses the commissioner data set
and our [*424] empirical results on the relationship between revolving-door laws and commissioners' characteristics.
Section 4 concludes.
2. Revolving-Door Regulations and Electricity Prices
We first analyze how post-government-employment restrictions affect outcomes by examining the impact of these
laws on electricity prices. By post-government-employment restrictions and revolving-door regulations, we refer to
rules that impose restrictions on the job opportunities of government officials after their departure from government
service. If revolving-door regulations, by constraining the future career options of public utility commissioners, have the
intended effect of reducing the likelihood that commissioners will make decisions favorable to electric utilities, the
adoption of these laws may reduce electricity prices. This effect may also arise because revolving-door regulations
make it easier for other interest groups to influence public utility commissioners. For instance, organized electricity
consumers (for example, industrial users) may be better positioned to influence public utility commission (PUC) rate
setting if revolving-door laws are in place.
Because revolving-door regulations were introduced by different states at different times, we can estimate the effect
of the adoption of these regulations on prices by using a difference-in-differences (DID) framework. That is, we use
states that did not adopt regulation during the same period as a control group to identify the effects of revolving-door
regulations on prices from within-state variation in electricity prices following the introduction of a revolving-door law.
The data for this analysis come from several sources. We surveyed state ethics commissions, state attorney general
offices, and state statutes to obtain information on the years in which states adopted their first revolving-door law. Data
on residential, commercial, and industrial electricity prices, costs, and other time-varying state-level variables are from
Besley and Coate (2003) and Hauge, Jamison, and Prieger (2012). We use these data because the time period they cover
(1960-96) overlaps with the period during which state-level post-government-employment restrictions were adopted.
Descriptive statistics for the regression variables are shown in Table 1.
2.1. The Adoption of Revolving-Door Laws as a Quasi Experiment
To make valid causal inferences, we need to establish that the adoption of revolving-door regulations at the state
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level is exogenous with respect to other factors that influence electricity prices. Two pieces of evidence suggest that the
adoption of these regulations by state governments constitutes a valid quasi experiment. First,
post-government-employment restrictions apply to large numbers of public employees, not merely members of PUCs.
Indeed, utility commissioners are almost never explicitly mentioned in these statutes. Rather, the restrictions apply
generally to large segments of a state's public sector. This suggests that the adoption of these regulations was not
motivated by a perceived [*425] need to alter the behavior of public utility commissioners and electricity rates per se
but rather by a political demand to improve state-level government ethics more generally. In other words, because
revolving-door laws were adopted in response to a general desire to clean up government at the state level, the
introduction of these laws is probably uncorrelated with other factors that influence electricity prices.
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics, 1960-96
N Mean SD Min Max
Revolving-door regulation 1,824 .21 .41 0 1
Elected commissioner 1,824 .26 .44 0 1
Real residential prices per
kWh (cents) 1,824 6.33 1.71 .59 11.70
Real industrial prices per kWh
(cents) 1,824 3.65 1.26 .67 8.18
Real commercial prices per
kWh (cents) 1,824 5.93 1.67 1.99 13.69
Real fossil fuel cost index 1,812 .76 .55 .01 4.97
Real income per capita 1,776 10,308.72 2,486.60 4,067.57 21,152.96
State population 1,776 4,587,008 4,798,931 291,000 32,300,000
Percentage ages 5-17 1,776 22.50 3.62 14.70 35.40
Percentage ages [>=] 65 1,776 11.04 2.19 4.00 18.60
Legislature ideology index 1,824 55.68 14.21 18.64 81.47
Democratic governor indicator 1,824 .39 .47 0 1
Sources. Besley and Coate (2003); Hauge, Jamison, and Prieger (2012), with calculations by the authors.
Second, an analysis of the correlates of revolving-door regulations suggests that the adoption of these regulations is
sufficiently exogenous to generate valid causal inferences. If the adoption of post-government-employment regulations
is to serve as a quasi experiment, the characteristics of states that adopt revolving-door laws (the treatment group)
should be similar to the characteristics of states that do not (the control group). To determine whether this is the case,
we estimated a series of discrete-time Cox proportional hazard models to study the probability of adopting
revolving-door regulations. Our control variables were a series of state-year variables that proxied for changes in a
state's economic, political, and business environments. In particular, we included changes in real electricity prices and
production costs, changes in real per capita income, changes in state population, an indicator variable that equals one if
the state governor was a Democrat in a given state year and zero otherwise, and a time-varying index of a state
legislature's ideology (higher numbers on the index indicate a more liberal legislature). n4 We also included region
dummies and used state-level data from 1960-96 to estimate the models.
Hazard ratios from these estimations are displayed in Table 2. Values greater [*426] than 1 indicate an increase in
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the hazard ratio (that is, an increase in the likelihood of adopting revolving-door regulations), while values below 1
indicate a reduction in the hazard ratio (that is, a decrease in the likelihood of adopting revolving-door regulations). The
results suggest that there are no systematic relationships between state-level characteristics and the adoption of
revolving-door regulations. State-level residential, commercial, and industrial electricity prices have a positive but
statistically insignificant effect on the hazard ratio. Our proxies for a state's political and business climate--the
Democratic governor indicator and the legislature ideology index--are also not statistically significant. While we cannot
know for certain whether the adoption of revolving-door laws is truly exogenous, these results are supportive of the
possibility of a quasi experiment.
Table 2
Discrete-Time Hazard Model of the Adoption of Revolving-Door Regulations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Change in residential prices 1.03 .95
(.33) (-.89)
Change in commercial prices 1.32 1.05
(1.23) (.31)
Change in industrial prices 1.41 1.51
(1.04) (1.08)
Change in costs 1.02 1.02
(.89) (1.05)
Change in state population 1.49 1.19 1.21 1.23 1.19
(1.30) (.95) (1.21) (1.20) (.97)
Change in per capita income 1.10 1.16 1.16 1.08 1.16
(.68) (1.11) (1.10) (.53) (1.08)
Democratic governor indicator 1.02 1.02 1.01 1.03 1.01
(.78) (.75) (.77) (.80) (.78)
Legislative ideology .93 .93 .92 .93 .92
( 1.03) ( 1.03) ( 1.12) ( .98) ( 1.15)
N 1,397 1,397 1,397 1,364 1,364
Note. Values are hazard ratios from Cox proportionate hazard models, with z-statistics (clustered by state) in
parentheses. Region dummies are included. Smaller sample sizes are due to missing information on costs.
2.2. Effects of Revolving-Door Laws on Electricity Prices
We now turn to an analysis of the effects of revolving-door laws on electricity prices using states that do not adopt
revolving-door laws in a given year as a control group. As a first pass, we would like to see whether revolving-door
laws are correlated with changes in electricity prices. Creating a succinct visual representation of the effect of regulation
on electricity prices is difficult in our context since different states adopted regulations at different times over a 30-year
period. Accordingly, for each electricity price (industrial, residential, and commercial), we used the following
procedure. First, for each year we computed the average electricity price among states without revolving-door laws,
which we call the average price for no-law states. Second, we computed for each year and [*427] in each state with
revolving-door laws the difference between the state's own electricity price and the average price for no-law states,
which we call the adjusted price in states with laws. Finally, we averaged the adjusted prices in states with laws over the
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age of revolving-door laws, where a value of zero is assigned for the year of passage, positive ages are assigned to years
after the passage of the laws, and negative ages are assigned to years prior to the passage. This process gives us the
age-averaged adjusted price in states with laws, which is essentially the average difference between electricity prices in
states with revolving-door regulations and electricity prices in states without revolving-door regulations (over the life
span of the revolving-door laws). Figures 1, 2, and 3 show the relationship between the age-averaged adjusted price in
states with laws and the age of revolving-door laws (for the 5 years before and after the adoption of revolving-door
regulations) for industrial, residential, and commercial prices, respectively.
Two patterns are apparent from these figures. First, there is an upward trend in electricity prices in states that
adopted revolving-door regulations relative to states that did not. This is consistent with the positive (but not statistically
significant) coefficient estimate found for the effect of changes in electricity prices on the hazard ratio for adoption of
revolving-door regulations, as shown in Table 2. Second, in the first 3 years after revolving-door regulations are
introduced, this upward trend is dampened, most markedly for industrial prices, but after the third or fourth year the gap
between prices in states with and without revolving-door laws follows its original trend. Accordingly, the figures show
that revolving-door regulations may have reduced the growth rate of electricity prices, but the dampening effects are
only temporary.
To determine whether these effects of revolving-door laws on electricity prices are robust to other state-level
control variables, we estimate the following regression equation:
Image 1
where log(p[st]) is the natural logarithm of real electricity prices (residential, industrial, or commercial) in state s during
year t; elected[st] is an indicator variable that equals one if state s elects its public utility commissioners in year t and
zero otherwise; revolving[st] is an indicator variable that equals one if state s has adopted a revolving-door law by year
t and zero otherwise; X[st] is a vector of state-year control variables that includes a measure of electricity production
costs (Besley and Coate's [2003] fuel cost index), state population, state population squared, the state-level legislative
ideology index, the Democratic governor indicator, real income per capita, real income per capita squared, the
percentage of the population over age 65, and the percentage of the population between ages 5 and 17; S[s] and T[t] are
state and year fixed effects; [gamma] [s] t is the state-specific time trend; and [epsilon] [st] is an error term.
[*428] Figure 1. Industrial electricity prices prior to and after the adoption of revolving-door regulations.
Figure 2. Residential electricity prices prior to and after the adoption of revolving-door regulations.
[*429] Figure 3. Commercial electricity prices prior to and after the adoption of revolving-door regulations.
We control for whether commissioners are elected or appointed because Besley and Coate (2003) find that elected
regulators set lower prices than appointed ones. State population and its squared term are included to allow for scale
economies in electricity production. We use the deflated value of Besley and Coate's (2003) fossil fuel cost index to
proxy for production costs. Real per capita income and its squared term as well as the demographic variables hold
constant factors that influence the demand for electricity in a given state-year. To control for a state's political and
business environment, we include the Democratic governor indicator and the state legislative ideology index. State and
year fixed effects control for unobserved heterogeneity at the state level and across time that may influence electricity
prices. Finally, we include state-specific trend terms that allow us to control at least partially for other unobservable
factors at the state level that change over time and might potentially influence electricity prices. The inclusion of trend
terms is also warranted since Figures 1-3 indicate that prices were rising in states that adopted regulations relative to
those in states that did not (although, as noted earlier, this effect is not statistically significant).
For each electricity price, we estimate two separate regression models. The first model includes the revolving-door
indicator, the elected commissioner indicator, state and year fixed effects, and the state-specific trend terms. The second
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model also includes all the other time-varying state-level variables mentioned earlier. Table 3 shows the regression
results. Columns 1-3 show the coefficient estimates from the first model, in which the dependent variable is the log of
[*430] Table 3 Effects of Revolving-Door Regulations on the Log of Electricity Prices
industrial price, the log of residential price, and the log of commercial price, respectively. In columns 4-6, the second
model is used to obtain the coefficient estimates.
The coefficient of interest is x, which is the DID estimate of the effects of revolving-door regulations on electricity
prices. If revolving-door laws reduce the influence of electricity producers (and perhaps increase the influence of
electricity consumers) on the regulatory apparatus, x should be negative and statistically significant. But, as shown in
Table 3, for all three types of electricity prices, the coefficient on the revolving-door regulation variable (x) is
statistically insignificant, whether or not time-varying controls are included. Consistent with Besley and Coate (2003),
we find that residential prices are lower when regulators are elected rather than appointed. n5
These basic findings survive several robustness checks. First, the results are unchanged when we use real electricity
prices (as opposed to their natural logarithm) as the dependent variable. Second, when we recode the revolving-door
indicator variable to be equal to one at 5 years prior to actual adoption (and all years after) or at 5 years after actual
adoption (and all years after), the coefficient estimates on the revolving-door variable are still statistically insignificant.
Accordingly, there are no anticipated or delayed effects of revolving-door regulations. Finally, qualitatively similar
results are found when we estimate the regression using data from every 5 years rather than annual data.
The limitation with the above approach is that the effects of revolving-door regulations in different years are
lumped together, which does not allow for the impact of revolving-door laws to vary over time, as suggested by Figures
1-3. Thus, we estimate the effects of regulation with separate dummy variables for [*431] each of the 5 years before
and after its passage. The results shown in Table 4 indicate that for industrial prices, having a revolving-door law
reduces prices within the first few years, but the effect disappears after the fourth year. For other prices, however, there
are no significant effects. n6 As before, residential prices (but not commercial or industrial prices) are lower in states
that elect their commissioners.
Table 4
Electricity Prices 5 Years before and after the
Adoption of Revolving-Door Regulations
Industrial Residential Commercial
Elected commissioner -.02 -.046 ** .004
(.02) (.016) (.004)
RD[t-5] -.033 -.036 * -.030
(.023) (.017) (.020)
RD[t-4] -.032 -.030 + -.017
(.025) (.017) (.024)
RD[t-3] -.038 -.038 * -.027
(.028) (.019) (.028)
RD[t-2] -.034 -.027 -.01
(.024) (.023) (.03)
RD[t-1] -.042 -.033 -.021
(.027) (.027) (.034)
RD [t] -.036 -.040 -.021
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(.028) (.032) (.042)
RD[t+1] -.049 + -.012 -.008
(.029) (.028) (.040)
RD[t+2] -.072 * -.029 -.039
(.030) (.031) (.040)
RD[t+3] -.064 + -.021 -.014
(.036) (.037) (.041)
RD[t+4] -.094 ** -.037 -.013
(.034) (.037) (.044)
RD[t+5] -.041 -.029 -.014
(.030) (.040) (.045)
RD[t+6+] -.050 -.014 -.001
(.040) (.42) (.042)
+ p < .10.
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
Note. Each regression includes year and state fixed effects, a time trend, and state-specific time trends, as well as all
remaining time-varying state-level covariates. The term RD[t+i] is an indicator variable that is equal to one for the i th
year after a revolving-door law is introduced and zero in all other years. The term RD [t+6+] is an indicator variable that
is equal to one in the sixth year and all subsequent years after a revolving-door law is introduced. Clustered standard
errors are in parentheses. N = 1,764.
[*432] The bottom line is that revolving-door laws have a temporary and negative effect on industrial prices but
not on other prices. The effect can be detected when we code separately for each year but not when we use a single
dummy variable. This makes sense since the effect is only temporary. These results are also consistent with the data
presented in Figures 1-3. The magnitude of the temporary effect on industrial prices is actually quite substantial, with
industrial prices lowered by 5, 7, 9, and 6 percent in the first 4 years after the passage of the revolving-door law.
Nevertheless, for the fifth year, as well as for the sixth and subsequent years, there is no statistically significant effect.
The overall results suggest that the effectiveness of the two mechanisms in reducing consumer-regulator agency
costs, namely, revolving-door laws and the election of commissioners, depends on the type of electricity price that is
regulated. For residential users, the method of commissioner selection (election versus appointment) seems to have the
largest and most statistically significant effect on lowering prices. For industrial prices, in contrast, the adoption of a
revolving-door law has the most negative and statistically significant effect on prices (relative to trend). However, as
shown in Figures 1-3, prices ultimately catch up with their preregulation trend. What explains this pattern?
While we cannot answer this question definitively, we posit the following argument. Commissioners who are
elected have a strong incentive to cater to the median voter. Among electricity consumers, the median voter is a
residential customer, not a commercial or industrial customer. This provides elected commissioners with a strong
incentive to keep residential rates low. In such an environment, a revolving-door law has at best a negligible additional
effect on lowering residential prices. Because the reelection incentive does not provide commissioners with as strong an
incentive to keep commercial or industrial prices low, other mechanisms (such as revolving-door laws) have a greater
Page 8
55 J. Law & Econ. 421, *431
potential to reduce regulator-consumer agency costs. In particular, organized consumers such as industrial electricity
users are well positioned to benefit from revolving-door laws, perhaps because they are not precluded from employing
former regulators.
However, over time this effect diminishes, and prices follow their preregulation trend. While we cannot determine
precisely why this occurs, we think that two factors are in play. First, for an industry such as electricity generation in
which price-cost margins are small, cost increases must eventually be passed on to consumers in the form of higher
prices. In fact, if we use the same procedure described earlier for electricity prices to graph the production cost index of
states with and without revolving-door regulations, we find that states that adopted revolving-door regulations also
experienced a steady upward trend in costs relative to states that did not. Regulators may therefore find it unsustainable
to keep prices low indefinitely. Second, after the revolving-door is foreclosed, utilities may adjust their political action
strategies and find other ways to influence utility commissioners (perhaps through larger campaign contributions to
elected [*433] regulators or through more intensive lobbying). Accordingly, the influence of regulated firms is only
temporarily abated by the adoption of revolving-door regulations.
3. Additional Effects of Revolving-Door Regulations
Here we provide some evidence on the additional effects of revolving-door regulations. In particular, we use
individual-level information for a sample of state public utility commissioners to explore the effects of revolving-door
regulations on commissioners' tenure length and their post-government-employment career paths. n7
Our working hypotheses are as follows. First, commissioners in states with revolving-door regulations will tend to
have shorter tenures. Because post-government-employment restrictions generally prohibit regulators from working for
companies or on cases in which they have been previously involved, these regulations may reduce the desirable length
of tenure. Second, commissioners in states with post-government-employment restrictions will be less likely to find jobs
with public utility companies or get employed in the private sector more generally. This could be because
revolving-door laws reduce the attractiveness of regulators as potential employees or because these regulations result in
the selection of less ambitious individuals into public service.
To test these hypotheses, we searched for information on all the commissioners who left their state public utility
commission jobs between 1994 and 2005. Among this group of 129 commissioners, we were able to obtain information
on the year of departure and subsequent employment for 97. The data sources we used include various publications by
the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC 1992-2003a, 1992-2003b, 1994-2005), the
Council on Government Ethics Laws (COGEL 1993-2002), and online sources. Table 5 provides summary statistics of
various characteristics of this group of individuals, as well as information on the PUCs where they worked before their
departure. Because our sample is small, the results from this analysis should be interpreted cautiously.
Table 6 presents regression estimates of how revolving-door laws affect tenure length and the probability of
working for the private sector after departure. Instead of using the dummy variable indicating the existence of any
post-government-employment restrictions, we use an indicator for whether a commissioner is forbidden to work on
previous cases after leaving the government. Compared to the more generic dummy variable for a revolving-door law,
the latter provides more detailed information on the type of restrictions faced by commissioners. In particular, it tells us
whether the law restricts a former commissioner's [*434] engagement in cases that she may have been involved with as
a regulator.
Table 5
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Master's degree or higher .71 .46
Tenure (years) 6.63 5.20
Works for private sector after departure .36 .48
Commission characteristic:
Revolving-door-regulation indicator (at time of departure) .66 .47
Commissioner forbidden to work for regulated utilities .11 .30
(at time of departure)
Stipulated term length for commissioners 5.40 .91
Commissioner salary relative to per capita income in state 3.11 .54
(at of departure)
Sources. Commissioner characteristics and stipulated term lengths for commissioners are from NARUC (1992-2003a,
1992-2003b, 1994-2005) and the authors' online searches. Information on post-government-employment restrictions is
from COGEL (1993-2002), the authors' survey of state ethics commissions and state attorney general offices, and online
searches. N = 97.
The results show that this specific type of post-government-employment restriction has a negative and statistically
significant effect on the tenure length of state public utility commissioners, and it also has a negative and statistically
significant effect on the likelihood of a commissioner's securing subsequent employment in the private sector. For the
tenure regression, we use ordinary least squares estimation, while we use the logistic estimation for the
future-employment regression.
These results are consistent with our hypotheses, showing that revolving-door laws may have other unintended
consequences. Given that experience is important for any job, the higher turnover rate among utility commissioners in
revolving-door-law states may have harmful effects on the quality of public service. In addition, to the extent that the
restrictions on future job prospects are binding, the position of public utility commissioner becomes less attractive. This
difference in circumstances may reduce the talent pool from which public utility commissioners are drawn.
4. Conclusion
This paper evaluates the effects of post-government-employment restrictions on electricity prices. We find that the
introduction of revolving-door laws does not lower residential or commercial electricity prices. These laws do reduce
industrial electricity prices, but only temporarily. This would suggest that post-government-employment restrictions
temporarily reduce the scope of industry capture, but perhaps only by delaying the inevitable pass-through of costs by
electricity producers. Future work should investigate whether these findings are unique to electric utilities or apply to
other regulated industries as well.
There is also some evidence that revolving-door laws influence the characteristics [*435] of public utility
commissioners. Commissioners from states with revolving-door laws are less likely to obtain subsequent employment
in the private sector and serve shorter terms in office than their colleagues from states without revolving-door laws.
Revolving-door laws may, therefore, have negative consequences in terms of selection into public employment. But
caution is called for in generalizing these results because of the small sample size of our commissioner data set.
Table 6
Revolving-Door Regulations, Tenure Length, and Future Employment
Years of Works for
Tenure Private Sector
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(1) (2)
Commissioner forbidden to work on previous
cases (at time of departure) -3.247 ** -.399 **
(.871) (.072)
Stipulated term length for commissioners .628
(.578)
Commissioner salary relative to per capita
income in state (at time of departure) -1.099
(1.259)
Commissioner has a master's degree or higher -.065
(.110)
** P < .01.
Note. Ordinary least squares regression is used for column 1, and the logistic model is used for column 2. The
coefficient estimates in column 2 are marginal effects, and robust standard errors clustered at the state level are in
parentheses. A former commissioner is considered to work for the private sector if she is not working for the
government or a nonprofit organization. N = 97. R<2> = .05.
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Legal Topics:
For related research and practice materials, see the following legal topics:
Constitutional LawCongressional Duties & PowersElectionsTime, Place & MannerEnergy & Utilities LawElectric
Power IndustryState RegulationGeneral OverviewEnergy & Utilities LawUtility CompaniesGeneral Overview
FOOTNOTES:
n1 For instance, as part of its Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch, the U.S. Office of Government Ethics
restricts the labor market opportunities of former federal employees. In addition, a number of federal agencies supplement these standards to
maintain even tighter restrictions. See, for instance, Regulations Concerning Post Employment Conflict of Interest (5 C.F.R. sec. 2637
[2012]) and Agency Supplemental Standards of Conduct Regulations. For details on state revolving-door laws, see COGEL (1993-2002).
n2 Boehm (1996) reports that several attorneys left state employment after New York enacted legislation in 1987 that placed restrictions on
employment opportunities of former government workers. This anecdote suggests that revolving-door laws may have some impact on the
types of individuals who serve in the public sector.
n3 Forty states currently have state ethics commissions that are charged with, among other tasks, enforcing revolving-door legislation.
n4 See Hauge, Jamison, and Preiger (2012) for details on the construction of the legislature ideology index.
n5 There are reasons, however, that our results are not strictly comparable with those of Besley and Coate (2003). First, in their regressions,
the dependent variable is the average price, not the natural log. Second, Besley and Coate exclude from their regressions all states that
switched their method of commissioner selection. We include these states in our regressions.
n6 It is interesting to note that during the fifth through third years prior to the adoption of a revolving-door law, residential prices are lower
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in states that eventually adopt revolving-door regulations, but the effect disappears in later years. We suspect that this is just an anomaly of
the data set.
n7 See Law and Long (2011) for a more thorough examination of the effects of revolving-door regulations on public utility commissioners.
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